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Some Principles of Texas Community
Property Law
William 0. Huie*
Basic Spanish Principles
The Texas community property system is derived from the
Spanish law. The Spanish community property rules, which
were the law of the land when Texas was under the sovereignty
of Spain and Mexico, were retained by the Texas Republic when
the English common law was adopted in 1840.1 But the original
Spanish rules have been greatly modified during the intervening
century. Some of the changes have been intentional, reflecting a
change in ideas as to the proper status of married women. Others
have resulted from the infiltration of rules and principles of Eng-
lish common law and equity, sometimes because of lack of full
information and understanding of the original civil law prin-
ciples.
Under the Spanish law the spouses were equal partners2 as
to all financial enterprises during the continuance of the mar-
riage, unless otherwise agreed in a marriage contract. Both
spouses contributed to the partnership their time and efforts and
the use of and revenue from their individual wealth. The indi-
vidual capital of each spouse consisted of the property owned
at marriage and the property acquired after marriage by inheri-
tance or by gift to the individual.8 At the dissolution of the
partnership the separate capital of each spouse was restored
before the division of the profits either by recognizing individual
ownership of specific property on hand or by allowing reimburse-
ment from the property on hand,4 all of which was presumed
to be community property.5
* Professor of Law, The University of Texas.
1. Tex. Laws 1840, p. 3, 2 LAws Or TExAs 177 (Gammel 1898).
2. See 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 264 (1943).
3. 1 id. §§ 63, 69.
4. As to reimbursement, see the translations of Spanish commentaries in
the second volume of de Funiak's work: Matienzo, 2 id. at 143, 213, 214,
246, 268, 269; Gutierrez, 2 id. at 186, 187; Azevedo, 2 id. at 170, 171; Llamas
y Molina, 2 id. at 411.
5. 1 4d. § 60.
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Texas has retained many of the basic principles of the Span-
ish law. The idea of a marital partnership has been retained,
and the Texas definitions of separate and community property
closely resemble those of the Spanish law. Separate ownership
of specific property was confined within narrow limits by the
definitions of the 1840 statute,6 but in the Constitution of 1845
the wife's separate property was defined as "all property, both
real and personal . . .owned or claimed by her before marriage,
and that acquired afterwards by gift, devise, or descent,"7 and
an 1848 statute contained a similar definition of the separate
property of both husband and wife." All other property acquired
during the marriage by either the husband or the wife was com-
munity, the statute said. Later constitutions have contained the
same definition of the wife's separate property," and there has
been no effective change of the statutory definitions.1 ° In Texas
today, as under the Spanish law, each spouse retains separate
ownership of the property owned at marriage and of the prop-
erty received by gift or inheritance during the marriage, but
property acquired during the marriage by the personal efforts
of either spouse is community, and the revenue from the separate
property of both spouses goes into the community.
Tracing Separate Property Through Changes in Form
Under the Spanish law it was possible in certain exceptional
cases to establish separate ownership of particular property by
tracing separate property into its product. For example, land
received in exchange for separate land was separate." Also
separate land could be sold and the proceeds reinvested in sep-
arately owned land. 12 But the tracing of separate property to
establish separate ownership of the product was narrowly con-
6. Tex. Laws 1804, p. 3, 2 LAWS OF TEXAS 177 (Gammel 1898).
7. TEX. CONST. Art. 7, § 19 (1845), 2 LAWS OF TEXAS 1923 (Gammel 1898).
8. Tex. Laws 1848, c. 79, p. 77, 3 LAWS OF TEXAS 77 (Gammel 1898).
9. TEX. CONST. ANN. Art. 16, § 15 (Vernon, Supp. 1954).
10. An attempt to change the definitions by putting the revenue from
separate property into the separate estate was held invalid as to the revenue
from the wife's separate property in Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273
S.W. 799 (1925), and in 1929 the legislature restored the older definitions of
the separate estates of both spouses, Tex. Laws 1929, c. 32, p. 66, 26 LAWS
OF TEXAS 66 (Gammel 1929). For the present statutory definitions, see TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Arts. 4613, 4614, 4619 (Vernon, 1951).
11. It is clear that tracing to establish separate ownership was permitted
upon an exchange of land. Judging from the broad language of the writers,
the same principle may have been applied to other kinds of property
acquired by exchange as distinguished from purchase. See the translations
from Matienzo, 2 -DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 142 (1943),
and Gutierrez, 2 id. at 186.
12. See the translations from Matienzo, 2 id. at 143, Azevedo, 2 id. at 174,
175, and Gutierrez, 2 id. at 186.
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fined. The general rule was that property bought during the
marriage with separate funds was community property,1 3 the
spouse whose funds were used receiving reimbursement from
community assets at the dissolution of the marital partnership. 14
In Texas the ownership tracing principle has been greatly
extended. The leading case was Love v. Robertson," decided in
1851. The opinion in that case shows that the departure from
Spanish law resulted from a failure to understand fully the
Spanish rules. The husband had used his separate money to
buy two slaves, Peter and Finn. He paid cash for Peter. For
Finn he paid in cash with separate funds $330 of a total purchase
price of $800; the balance was paid later out of community funds.
After the husband's death a controversy arose over whether the
slaves were separate property or community property. It ap-
pears from the authorities now available that the Spanish law
would have awarded ownership of the slaves to the community,
and the husband's heir would have received reimbursement
from the community for the separate funds used in making the
purchase, but apparently no adequate exposition of the Spanish
law was available. Language of a prior case indicated that under
the Spanish law property bought by either spouse after marriage
was community property even though it was paid for with sep-
arate funds, but there had been no recognition in the authorities
brought to the court's attention of the Spanish rule that the
separate capital so invested in community property was to be
restored at the dissolution of the community. The possibility of
reimbursement as an alternative to ownership was not suggested
by counsel nor considered by the court.' 6 In the absence of
13. See Savenant v. Le Breton, 1 La. 520, 522 (1830). According to
Matienzo, the money brought by the spouses to the marriage became com-
munity property forthwith; hence anything bought with it became com-
munity property. See the translation in 2 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY 143 (1943). See also the translation of Gutierrez, 2 id. at
186, 187. There was not complete harmony among the Spanish writers, and
although the rule stated above seems to have been accepted by most of
them, Professor de Funiak has concluded that there was only a rebuttable
presumption that property bought with separate funds was bought for the
community. See 1 id. § 77.
14. See the translations from Matienzo and Gutierrez, supra note 13.
15. 7 Tex. 6 (1851).
16. Although the Texas court was looking to Louisiana cases for guidance,
the Louisiana cases directly in point were not brought to the court's atten-
tion. In Brown v. Cobb, 10 La. 172 (1836), it had been held that a slave
bought by the husband with his separate funds was community property
because the conveyance to the husband contained no language to indicate
that he intended for the slave to be his separate property. In Young v.
Young, 5 La. Ann. 611 (1850), it had become established that in such a case
the husband would be allowed reimbursement from the community for the
amount of his separate funds used in making the purchase.
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compensation to the husband for his separate funds, awarding
the slaves to the community would have been a very unjust re-
sult. To avoid what it deemed an obvious injustice to the hus-
band, the court concluded that property bought with separate
funds should be separate, and that payment of part of the pur-
chase price with separate funds should give a fractional separate
interest. Peter was separate; Finn was owned by a mixed title,
330/800ths separate and 470/800ths community.
From the time of that decision it has been established in
Texas that the principle of tracing separate property through
changes in form to establish separate ownership of the product
is one of general applicability. r 7 It is not confined to exceptional
situations, as was true under the Spanish law, but is applied to
usual transactions, such as a purchase of property with separate
funds. It is applied even though only a fraction of the total con-
sideration is paid with separate funds.'8
Intention as Sometimes Controlling under Application of Trust
Principles
The opinion in Love v. Robertson 9 cited no trust cases and
did not use trust terminology, but the ownership tracing principle
the court was applying in that case is the same principle which
enables the beneficiary of a trust to trace the trust property
through changes in form to establish separate ownership of new
acquisitions by the trustee. Within a few years the Texas courts
were using trust language and were looking to trust cases as
controlling precedents.
In Smith v. Strahan,2 decided in 1856, the husband had used
his separate property to buy land in his wife's name. Looking
to the law of trusts as developed in common law jurisdictions, the
court held that an intent to make a gift of the property to the
wife would be presumed in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary, but that the presumption could be rebutted by parol evi-
dence that a gift was not intended. Rebutting the presumption
of gift would raise a purchase-money resulting trust in favor of
the husband, equitable ownership vesting in him as separate
property, unless a loan to the wife was intended.
In the converse case, where the wife's funds are used to
17. Rose v. Houston, 11 Tex. 324, 62 Am. Dec. 478 (1854); SPEER, LAW OF
MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS § 426 (3d ed. 1929).
18. Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937).
19. 7 Tex. 6 (1851).
20. 16 Tex. 314, 67 Am. Dec. 622 (1856).
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buy land in the husband's name, there is a presumption of a
resulting trust in favor of the wife as her separate property,2 1
a presumption which can be rebutted by oral evidence that a
gift or loan 22 to the husband was intended. Evidence of a gift
would place ownership in the husband as his separate property.
If the wife's funds are loaned to the husband, the money thereby
becomes community property in the absence of further evidence,23
and property bought with the money would likewise be pre-
sumed to be community property.
The likelihood that a gift to the wife is intended would seem
as great in a case where the husband uses community funds to
buy property in the wife's name as in a case where he uses his
separate funds to make such a purchase. But in the former case
a gift to the wife is not presumed in the absence of further evi-
dence. Where community funds are used to make the purchase
in the wife's name it was first thought that the community prop-
erty law fixed ownership in the community and that an intent
to make a gift to the wife could not be given effect.2 4 That notion
was soon rejected and an intent to make a gift to the wife was
given effect although proved merely by parol evidence,25 but
the civil law tradition, under which property standing in the
name of either spouse is presumed to be community, was strong
enough to prevent a presumption of gift from the mere fact that
the husband takes title in the wife's name when he buys prop-
erty with community funds.
When title to property bought with separate funds is taken
in the name of both spouses, the equitable ownership will again
depend, in the final analysis, upon the intention of the parties at
the time of acquisition. There are several possibilities as to
21. There is substantial conflict in other jurisdictions whether a gift
to the husband or a resulting trust to the wife should be presumed, most
courts presuming a trust to the wife. 2A BOCERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 460
(1953); Note, 113 A.L.R. 339 (1938). In Texas it has been assumed without
discussion that there is a presumption of a trust to the wife. Matador Land
& Cattle Co. v. Cooper, 87 S.W. 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905). In accord are
cases where proof that a wife's funds were used to buy property, title being
taken in the husband's name, was held sufficient to establish separate owner-
ship in the wife. Evans v. Welborn, 74 Tex. 530, 12 S.W. 230, 15 Am. St. Rep.
858 (1889); Blum v. Rogers, 71 Tex. 668, 9 S.W. 595 (1888); Yoe v. Mont-
gomery, 68 Tex. 338, 4 S.W. 622 (1887); Ross v. Kornrumpf, 64 Tex. 390 (1885).
22. Levy v. Williams, 50 S.W. 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), writ of error
refused.
23. Money borrowed by the husband during the marriage is presumed
to be community property. Foster v. Hackworth, 164 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942). The problem of determining the separate or community charac-
ter of property acquired on credit is discussed page 615 infra.
24. See Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314, 323, 67 Am. Dec. 622, 626 (1856).
25. Higgins v. Johnson's Heirs, 20 Tex. 389, 70 Am. Dec. 394 (1857).
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intent. One is that the spouse whose funds were used is to have
separate equitable ownership of the entire title. A second possi-
bility is that each of the spouses is to own an undivided half
interest as separate property. A third possibility is that com-
munity ownership is intended. The fact that title is taken in
the name of both spouses would seem to furnish a strong indica-
tion that the property is intended to belong to both spouses,
either as community property or as co-owners by separate titles.
However, the Texas cases involving the problem have extended
the presumption of a resulting trust to the situation where title
is taken in the name of both spouses. According to those cases,
the presumption of community is rebutted merely by evidence
that the property was paid for with separate funds; that evi-
dence alone will be sufficient to establish separate equitable own-
ership of the entire title in the spouse whose funds were used
in the absence of further evidence to rebut the presumption of
a resulting trust.26 No real consideration of whether the pre-
sumption of a resulting trust will effectuate the probable inten-
tion of the parties is indicated by the opinions in those cases, and
perhaps a full consideration of the question would result in a
conclusion that the presumption of community should be given
controlling effect in the absence of evidence that separate equit-
able ownership was intended.
Where the evidence establishes that title was taken in the
name of both spouses with the intent that the property should be
community property, the Texas cases have given effect to the
intent, holding that the property is community property al-
though bought with separate funds. 27 In such a case the spouse
whose separate funds were used would ordinarily be entitled to
reimbursement from community assets at the dissolution of the
26. See Foster v. Christensen, 67 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex. Corn. App. 1934),
and Sparks v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 129 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939), error ref. (separate funds of wife); Jones v. Jones, 181 S.W.2d
988, 991 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), writ of error refused for want of merit; and
Cummins v. Cummins, 224 S.W. 903, 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (separate
funds of husband).
27. Jones v. Jones, 181 S.W.2d 988, 991 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Cummins
v. Cummins, 224 S.W. 903, 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). But see Sparks v.
Humble Oil & Refining Co., 129 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), error
ref., where the court expresses a contra view, relying on the opinion in
Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937). The statements in those
opinions are derived from a misapplication of the well-established Texas
view that the separate or community character of property depends on the
application of the law to the facts, not on the mere intention of the parties.
That principle, which is discussed pages 611-615 infra, does not prevent the
intention of the spouses from being a controlling operative fact in certain
cases.
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marital partnership.2 8 The general rule that property bought
with separate funds becomes separate is therefore not a fixed
rule of uniform application; it is a rule of presumed intent,
justifiable only in those circumstances where a presumption of
a resulting trust will effectuate the probable intention of the
parties.
Full recognition that the rule under which property bought
with separate funds becomes separate is based on a presumption
that separate ownership is intended will result in significant re-
strictions on the application of the rule, for there are a number
of situations where an inference of an intention to invest separate
funds for community benefit would be more reasonable than an
inference of an intention to invest for the benefit of the separate
estate. For example, where separate funds are invested in a
stock of merchandise, it would be virtually impossible to pre-
serve the corpus of the separate estate in the form of specific
identifiable assets into which the original separate funds could
be traced; mingling of principal and income is almost inevitable.
It would be reasonable to assume that a spouse who makes such
an investment of separate funds would prefer to preserve his
or her separate capital in the form of a claim for reimbursement
from community assets, thereby avoiding the difficulties involved
in trying to trace separate funds through changes in form.
The results of the Texas cases furnish support for a conclu-
sion that reimbursement from community assets is the only
remedy that will actually be available to a spouse who invests
separate funds in a mercantile enterprise. The courts have never
expressly stated that the ownership tracing principle is not
appropriate in that kind of case, but the claims to ownership of
specific property have usually been denied because of the ming-
ling of separate and community funds, 29 while under similar
facts claims to reimbursement of separate funds or property
absorbed in the operation of a business have been successfully
maintained. 30 The analysis that will go far to explain and recon-
cile the results of the cases is simply that the ownership tracing
28. Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1.935).
29. Hardee v. Vincent, 136 Tex. 99, 147 S.W.2d 1072 (1941); Gibson v.
Gibson, 202 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Walker-Smith Co. v. Coker,
176 S.W.2d 1002 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), error ref. w.o.m.
30. Schmidt v. Huppmann, 73 Tex. 112, 11 S.W. 175 (1889); Tittle v. Tittle,
221 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). A reimbursement theory also seems to
be the proper explanation for the holdings in Hartman v. Hartman, 253
S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), and Farrow v. Farrow, 238 S.W.2d 255
(Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
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principle is not applicable to separate money spent in the opera-
tion of a business for community benefit; in those cases, instead
of presuming that individual ownership of property bought with
separate funds is intended, it is proper to presume an intention
to invest the separate funds for community benefit, the individ-
ual spouse to receive reimbursement later from community
assets.
That approach may also furnish an explanation for the re-
cent holding of the Texas Supreme Court in Norris v. Vaughan.8 1
One of the important holdings in that case was that interests in
oil and gas leases acquired by the husband during the marriage
were community property although the interests were paid for
and developed with the husband's separate funds. Since the basis
for the court's conclusion is not entirely clear, the circumstances
of the case will be stated in some detail.
The leasehold, interests in controversy were acquired during
the marriage by partnerships of which the husband was a mem-
ber at the time of the marriage. Some of the interests, referred
to in the opinion as the McDowell and Taylor wells, were ac-
quired under "farmout" agreements negotiated by the husband,
under which one of the partnerships drilled certain wells in re-
turn for assignments of leasehold interests. Two other leases,
referred to in the opinion as the Hill and Cantrell leases, were
acquired direct from the lessors. The latter leases were not
negotiated by the husband; they were procured by other mem-
bers of a partnership in which the husband owned a one-fourth
interest. Only nominal amounts were recited as the cash con-
sideration for the Hill and Cantrell leases; one recited five dollars
and the other ten. The drilling of the leases was done by the
partnerships with partnership funds. From an audit of the
partnership books it was concluded that no community funds
had been used in the drilling of the wells; apparently all of the
net income earned subsequent to the marriage had been with-
drawn from both partnerships, and the court treated the case as
if the drilling had been done with the husband's separate funds.
Presumably the court also took the same view as to the partner-
ship funds used in paying the nominal cash bonuses and delay
rentals of the Hill and Cantrell leases, although the opinion
contains no express statement to that effect.
If the leasehold interests were acquired for the partnerships,
not for the partners individually, there might be some difficulty
31. 260 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1953).
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in reconciling the court's analysis with the usual concept of the
nature of a partner's interest in partnership property, but
assuming the correctness of the court's basic approach, the hold-
ing can be stated in a simple form that eliminates the partner-
ship aspect of the case. Viewing the case as one where a husband
has acquired leasehold interests during the marriage and has used
his separate funds to pay for and develop the leases, the Supreme
Court refused to determine the ownership of the interests by
looking to the character of the funds so used. Reversing the
court of civil appeals on that point, the Supreme Court held
that the leasehold interests were community property and that
the separate estate should be reimbursed from community assets
the amount of the separate funds spent. The court reasoned
that the leases should be regarded as a product of the husband's
personal efforts, referring to the talent and labor involved in
the making of the deals by which the leases were acquired. The
Hill and Cantrell leases, which were acquired through the efforts
of the husband's partners, were also held to be community prop-
erty. As to them it was reasoned that the efforts of the husband's
partners should be regarded as the husband's own efforts for the
purpose of deciding the question before the court.
The reasoning in the opinion does not furnish an entirely
satisfactory explanation for the court's decision. The effort, skill,
and judgment involved in making investments of separate funds
have not in the past been regarded as a sufficient basis for award-
ing ownership to the community of property acquired with sep-
arate funds.3 2 Why in this case did the court feel it was neces-
sary to regard the leases as a product of the husband's efforts
instead of looking to the character of the consideration given in
exchange for them?
Perhaps the court's decision can be justified on the ground
that the ownership tracing principle was not an appropriate one
for the solution of the problem before the court. When the hus-
band uses $20,000 of his separate money to buy a tract of land, it
can properly be said that the money has been exchanged for the
land, and a presumption of a resulting trust in favor of the
husband's separate estate arises, under the established Texas
rule. But the leasing of property for mineral development does
not involve a comparable exchange of value equivalents. The
bonus paid for the lease may be very large or very small; in
32. Cabell v. Menczer, 35 S.W. 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896); Evans v. Purin-
ton, 34 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), error ref.
1955]
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many cases it would be only a nominal part of the total return
the lessor would expect from the lease. Strange results could
be obtained if the separate or community character of a mineral
lease were allowed to depend on the separate or community
character of the funds used to pay the bonus. The husband could
use five dollars of his separate funds to acquire a lease in un-
proven territory, risk many thousands of dollars of community
funds in drilling a test well, and then claim the lease for his
separate estate after its value had been established by produc-
tion. Nor would it be desirable to let the separate or community
character of the lease depend upon whether separate or com-
munity funds are used to pay the delay rentals, the payment of
which merely entitles the lessee to defer the commencement of
drilling operations. The desire on the part of the lessor to obtain
development of the minerals is normally the principal inducing
cause for his execution of a mineral lease, and it would not be
entirely unrealistic to say that the lessee receives the leasehold
interest in exchange for a total consideration consisting of the
bonus, the delay rentals, and whatever time and money the de-
velopment and operation of the leased premises may involve.
But the leasehold must be given a separate or community char-
acter at the time it is acquired; at that time the amount that
may be spent in the future on delay rentals and on drilling and
operating expenses cannot be known.
The simplest solution of the problem would be to regard
mineral leases acquired by either spouse during the continuance
of the marriage as community property, allowing reimburse-
ment at the dissolution of the community to the spouse whose
separate funds have gone into the acquisition and development
of the leases. That is the solution that was actually found by
the Supreme Court in Norris v. Vaughan, and although the court's
explanation of its decision causes uncertainty as to the circum-
stances under which the case will be controlling, it should be
regarded as an important precedent establishing that there are
some situations where the ownership tracing principle is not
appropriate and will not be used, and that cases where separate
funds are used to acquire and develop mineral leases fall within
that category.
If a conclusion of community ownership of certain types of
property acquired with separate funds is based on a presumption
of intent to acquire the property for the community, a different
conclusion could be expected in cases where an intent to acquire
[VOL. XV
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for the separate estate is clearly manifested by reliable evidence
at the time the property is acquired. But from the opinion in
Norris v. Vaughan, which relies upon the theory that the effort
involved in finding and negotiating the leases gave them a
community character, it seems possible that intention will not
be controlling in cases where oil and gas leases are acquired with
separate funds. It may be that in those cases the Texas court
is returning to an approach essentially like that of the Spanish
law and will simply say that the property is community because
acquired during the marriage otherwise than by gift, devise, or
descent, even though acquired with separate funds.
Property Acquired on Credit
The character of property as separate or community is fixed
at the time it is acquired, whether it is bought with cash or on
credit. When property is bought for cash it can be regarded as
standing in the place of and taking its character from the money
for which it is exchanged. But when property is bought on
credit it is received in exchange not for money or other property
but for a mere promise to pay. Since the character of the prop-
erty must be fixed at the time it is acquired, the character of
the funds that are later used to pay the purchase-money debt
cannot control. If property is community at the time it is ac-
quired, the later use of separate funds to pay the purchase-
money debt will not give the property a separate character.83
A right of reimbursement can be established by tracing separate
funds into the payment of the purchase-money debt,3 4 with sub-
rogation in some cases to the rights of the creditor, 35 but not
ownership of the property.
The controlling rule in most credit acquisition cases is the
presumption that property acquired on credit during the mar-
riage is community;3 6 usually there will be no evidence to rebut
the presumption. If property is acquired partly for cash and
partly on credit, the presumption of community is applied to the
credit portion of the purchase price even though the down pay-
ment is made in whole or in part with separate funds. If the
husband buys land for a total purchase price of $20,000, using
his separate funds to make a down payment of $5,000 at the
33. Goddard v. Reagan, 28 S.W. 352 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
34. Allen v. Allen, 101 Tex. 362, 107 S.W. 528 (1908).
35. Van v. Webb, 147 Tex. 299, 215 S.W.2d 151 (1948).
36. Foster v. Hackworth, 164 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); SPEER,
LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS § 369 (3d ed. 1929).
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time of the deed and giving his notes for the balance, in the ab-
sence of further evidence the husband will own an undivided
one-fourth interest in the land as his separate property and the
community will own an undivided three-fourths interest.3 7 To
the extent of the credit portion of the purchase price, the un-
divided three-fourths, the courts say that the property is bought
on community credit.
What evidence will be sufficient to rebut the presumption
of community in cases involving credit acquisitions? On that
question there is an area of uncertainty in the Texas law, and
some confusion. The courts speak of separate and community
credit, and sometimes seem to have in mind a characterization of
an obligation as separate or community on the basis of the char-
acter of the property that the creditor can reach to satisfy the
obligation. But such a concept will not explain the holdings of
the cases. For example, when a married woman buys land on
credit, the seller is usually unable to hold her liable for the
purchase price and therefore cannot force payment out of her
separate estate,38 but that fact does not prevent a court from
holding that the land belongs to the wife as her separate prop-
erty if there is an agreement at the time of acquisition that the
purchase-money debt is to be discharged with the wife's separate
funds. Furthermore, it is possible for the property to become the
wife's separate property even though the seller does hold a
legally enforceable claim for the purchase price against the
husband and the community. There have been several cases
holding that land conveyed to the wife was entirely her separate
property although the purchase-money note was signed by both
the husband and the wife and the vendor could have held the
husband and the community liable but could not have reached
the wife's separate estate; in those cases the controlling fact was
that the husband and the wife had agreed at the time the prop-
erty was acquired that the purchase-money debt was to be paid
out of the wife's separate estate.
39
But some uncertainty in the law was introduced by lan-
guage in Gleich v. Bongio.40 In that case the court said:
37. Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937).
38. Houston Loan & Investment Co. v. Abernathy, 131 Tex. 601, 117
S.W.2d 1089 (1938).
39. McClintic v. Midland Grocery & Dry Goods Co., 106 Tex. 32, 154
S.W. 1157 (1913); Schuster v. Bauman Jewelry Co., 79 Tex. 179, 15 S.W. 259,
23 Am. St. Rep. 327 (1890); Foster v. Christensen, 67 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Com.
App. 1934) (conveyance to husband and wife).
40. 128 Tex. 606, 612, 99 S.W.2d 881, 884 (1937).
f'VOL. XV
1955] TEXAS COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW 617
"The mere intention of the husband and wife cannot
convert property purchased with an obligation binding upon
the community into the separate estate of either spouse. To
accomplish that purpose the vendor must have agreed with
the vendee to look only to his or her separate estate for the
satisfaction of the deferred payments."
Although that language seems to have been intended by
the court as a statement of existing law as derived from prior
cases, actually it contained two new requirements for rebutting
the presumption of community in cases where property is ac-
quired on credit: (1) the vendor must participate in an agree-
ment that the purchase-money debt is to be paid from the
separate estate, and (2) the agreement must be that the vendor
will look only to the separate estate for satisfaction. Both of the
new propositions are inconsistent with prior decisions. In several
cases holding that separate ownership in the wife had been
established it affirmatively appeared that the husband had
signed the purchase-money notes, with nothing to rebut the
inference that in the event of default the creditor could reach
community assets through a judgment against him.41 And in one
of the prior Supreme Court cases the vendor was not a party to
the agreement that the purchase-money obligation would be
paid with the wife's separate funds; the court's conclusion that
the land was separate was based explicitly upon an agreement
between the husband and the wife, with no mention of any
participation by the vendor.
42
The actual holding in Gleich v. Bongio43 was not inconsis-
tent with those prior decisions; only the language was. The case
was one where the husband used his entire separate estate to
make a down payment on the purchase price of land bought
largely on credit. It was a clear case for the application of the
presumption of community as to the credit portion of the pur-
chase price. There was no agreement between the husband and
the wife as to how the balance of the purchase price would be
paid and no other evidence to justify a claim that the presump-
tion of community as to the credit portion had been rebutted.
It is very doubtful, therefore, that the language quoted
above will be followed. A few later civil appeals opinions have
41. Note 39 supra.
42. McClintic v. Midland Grocery & Dry Goods Co., 106 Tex 32, 154 S.W.
1157 (1913).
43. 128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937).
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purported to follow it,44 but the decisions can be justified on
other grounds, and there has been at least one inconsistent hold-
ing by a court of civil appeals.45
It seems probable, therefore, that Texas will continue to
permit the husband to lend community credit to the wife in
order that she may buy property for her separate estate. An
agreement between the husband and the wife at the time of the
deed that the purchase-money debt will be paid out of the wife's
separate estate will probably continue to be sufficicnt to rebut
the presumption of community even though the vendor relies
on the husband's promise to pay. Also, despite the language
quoted above, Texas courts will doubtless continue to hold that
the husband can make gifts to the wife by buying property for
her on credit, including community credit. 46
A somewhat different problem is presented in the situation
where the husband attempts to rebut the presumption of com-
munity and establish separate ownership in himself of property
bought on credit. From the language in Gleich v. Bongio47 it
appears that it would be sufficient to prove an agreement be-
tween the husband and the vendor at the time of the acquisition
that the vendor will look only to the husband's separate estate
for satisfaction of the obligation. But if the property is bought
on the husband's general credit without any agreement of that
kind, the community being reachable by the vendor to satisfy
the obligation, would an agreement between the husband and
the wife at the time of the acquisition that the purchase-money
debt will be paid out of the husband's separate estate be effective
to establish separate ownership? It could be argued that the
husband can lend community credit to the wife to enable her
to acquire property for her separate estate because the husband
is the manager of the community 48 and that, since the wife does
not have general managerial power over the community, she
does not have power to bind herself by a consent to the hus-
band's use of community credit in the acquisition of property
for his separate estate.
44. Gorman v. Gorman, 180 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), error dism.;
Price v. Service Bureau, 165 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), error ref. w.o.m.
45. Edsall v. Edsall, 240 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). The holding
in Rath v. Rath, 218 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), also seems difficult
to reconcile with the language in Gleich v. Bongio.
46. Goldberg v. Zellner, 235 S.W. 870 (Tex. Com. App. 1921).
47. 128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937).
48. The management of the community during the continuance of the
marriage is discussed page 629 infra.
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At the opposite extreme it is arguable that even without the
wife's consent the husband should be able to use his general
credit to acquire property for his separate estate. A recent de-
cision by a court of civil appeals permits him to do so if he has
the intention at the time of the credit acquisition to discharge
the obligation with his separate funds. In Edsall v. Edsal149 the
husband desired to sell a tract of his separate land and use the
proceeds to buy a different tract, but he consummated the pur-
chase of the new tract before the sale of the old tract, using his
general credit to obtain the money to pay for the new tract. He
borrowed the money from a bank, giving his promissory note,
and used the money to pay for the new tract. One week later
he sold the old tract and used the proceeds to discharge the note.
In subsequent litigation over the separate or community char-
acter of the new tract the trier of fact found that at the time
the husband obtained the loan he had the intention to sell his
separate land and pay the note with the proceeds of the sale. In
view of that finding, a conclusion that the borrowed money and
the land bought with it belonged to the husband's separate estate
was upheld.
In another civil appeals case involving a similar situation the
husband secured the wife's consent to the use of community
cash in the acquisition of a new tract of land for the husband's
separate estate, it being agreed at the time of the purchase con-
tract that other land belonging to the husband's separate estate
would be sold and the proceeds used to pay the balance of the
purchase price and to reimburse the community for community
funds used in making the down payment. It was the view of the
court that under the circumstances there was no impediment to
effectuating the agreement of the spouses that the new acquisi-
tion should be the husband's separate property.5 °
If the husband owns an ample separate estate at the time
of the credit acquisition there would be little risk of injustice to
the wife in allowing the husband to use his general credit to
acquire property for his separate estate provided his intention to
buy for his separate estate and pay the purchase-money debt
with his separate funds could be established by reliable evidence
contemporaneous with the purchase. If the husband's subjective
intent were allowed to control in the absence of evidence of that
kind, he might be tempted to claim the best investments for his
49. 240 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
50. Rath v. Rath, 218 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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separate estate and leave the others for the community. In the
Edsall case' the husband's intent to borrow the money for his
separate estate and repay the loan with separate funds seems
not to have been manifested by any recital in the note or any
other reliable evidence exactly contemporaneous with the loan,
but since only a week elapsed between the borrowing of the
money and the repayment of the loan with separate funds, the
court's decision involved no great risk of injustice to the wife.
Agreements Between the Spouses
In Texas the general rule is that the spouses cannot change
the separate or community character of property by mere agree-
ment. That contractual disability has two aspects. They are
unable by contract to change in advance the character of prop-
erty to be acquired in the future; that is, they cannot by contract
substitute new rules for the rules of law by which the separate
or community character of property is determined. 52 And after
property has been acquired they cannot change the ownership
from separate to community or vice versa merely by declaring
their intention in a formal transfer.5 3 Property takes its char-
acter as separate or community by reason of the law operating
on the facts, and if the spouses wish to change the character of
property, they can do so only by providing the proper facts on
which the law can operate.
That the spouses would be unable to modify the rules deter-
mining the character of property by a postnuptial contract was
made clear by the language of the 1840 statute which retained
the Spanish community property system upon the adoption of
the English common law.5 4 The same statute also indicated that
prospective spouses would as a general rule be free to alter their
marital property rights by a written contract entered into prior
to the marriage. The statute was derived from the Louisiana
Civil Code,"5 under which the general validity of antenuptial
marriage contracts is well established,5 6 and if the question had
51. Edsall v. Edsall, 240 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
52. Brokaw v. Collett, 1 S.W.2d 1090 (Tex. Com. App. 1928); Cox v.
Miller, 54 Tex. 16 (1880).
53. Tittle v. Tittle, 148 Tex. 102, 220 S.W.2d 637 (1949); King v. Bruce,
145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803 (1947); Kellett v. Trice, 95 Tex. 160, 66 S.W. 51
(1902); Bruce v. Permian Royalty Co., 186 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945),
error ref. w.o.m.
54. Tex. Laws 1840, p. 3, 2 LAWS OF TEXAS 177 (Gammel 1898); Tzx. REV.
CIv. STAT. Arts. 4610-4612 (1925).
55. Arts. 2305-2310, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1825; Arts. 2325-2330, LA. CIVIL CODE
of 1870.
56. DAGGETT, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 114 (2d ed.
1945).
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been litigated at an earlier time probably the Texas courts would
have been generous in upholding the validity of such contracts.
But not until the case of Gorman v. Gause5 7 in 1933 was it con-
tended that the contractual disability of the spouses extended
to antenuptial as well as postnuptial contracts. By that time the
court seems to have lost touch with the civil law tradition under
which marriage contracts were encouraged and freely upheld.
Landmark decisions in the early twentieth century had given
sanctity to the statutory definitions of separate and community
property and to the constitutional definition of the wife's sep-
arate property. 58 In Gorman v. Gauze an antenuptial contract
stipulating against the community regime and providing for
separate ownership of all property acquired during the marriage
was held invalid as an attempt to modify in advance the char-
acter of property to be acquired. The statute only permits such
contracts as are not contrary to some rule of law, it was rea-
soned, and "[c]ertainly the Constitution and statutes defining
the status of property acquired during the marriage constitutes
a 'rule of law.'-59 Furthermore, the opinion of the commission
of appeals added, if the legislature does not have the power to
add to the wife's separate estate, surely the parties themselves
cannot do so by an antenuptial agreement.60
There was dictum in Gorman v. Gause that some antenuptial
contracts affecting marital property rights could be sustained
as not contravening any law of the state. For instance, it could
be agreed that the husband would convey to the wife one-half of
property he might acquire during the marriage by gift, devise
or descent, or that a certain portion of the community estate,
when acquired, would be conveyed by him to the wife and made
her separate property. In such a case the property would take
the character given it by law, the court reasoned, and then would
be subject to being disposed of as the parties had obligated them-
selves to do in the antenuptial contract.6 1 But as will be seen
from the discussion to follow, there is reason to doubt that the
types of contracts mentioned in the court's dictum could be sus-
tained. The difficulty lies in the requirement that the character
of property be determined by the law operating on the facts, not
by mere agreement of the parties.
57. 56 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Com. App. 1933).
58. Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925); Kellett v. Trice,
95 Tex. 160, 66 S.W. 51 (1902).
59. Gorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. Com. App. 1933).
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
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As an original proposition it would seem that the legal
definitions by which the separate or community character of
property is to be determined were intended to fix the rights of
the spouses in acquisitions from third persons and were not in-
tended to apply to transactions between the spouses affecting the
ownership of property already acquired. However, the opposite
view taken in the leading case of Kellett v. Trice62 is the es-
tablished Texas law. The legal definitions, as modified by the
ownership tracing principle, are given controlling effect in trans-
actions between the spouses. If the husband and wife want to
convert their separate property into community property or vice
versa, they must do it in such a way that the transaction can
be fitted into the legal definitions. The wife's separate property
cannot be converted into community property by gift, it was
held in Kellett v. Trice, because the law says that property
acquired by gift is separate. But the wife's separate property
can be changed by a gift into the husband's separate property
63
because the law says that property the husband receives by
gift is separate; the transaction fits into the legal definition and
the law operating on the facts accomplishes the desired result.
The husband can convert community property into the wife's
separate property by a gift to her, 64 and it seems that the wife
can convert community property into the husband's separate
property by a gift to him.65
In Texas there is no general disability on the part of the
spouses to bargain with each other, and they can change the
character of property if the transaction can be fitted into the legal
definitions or rules for determining the separate or community
character of property. For example, the wife can lend her
separate money to the husband66 and thereby change the money
into-community property. The manner by which the husband
acquires the money is such that under the established rules of
law it becomes community property; it comes to the husband
during the marriage, not by gift, devise, or descent, and not in
exchange for separate property. Likewise, if the wife sells
separate property to the husband, receiving payment in com-
munity funds, the property would be changed into community
62. 95 Tex. 160, 66 S.W. 51 (1902).
63. Riley v. Wilson, 86 Tex. 240, 24 S.W. 394 (1893).
64. Story v. Marshall, 24 Tex. 305 (1859).
65. Stratton v. Robinson, 67 S.W. 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902), error ref.;
King v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 657, 201 S.W.2d 803, 809 (1947).
66. Ryan v. Ryan, 61 Tex. 473 (1884); Cadwell v. Dabney, 208 S.W.2d 127
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948), writ of error refused, no reversible error.
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property and the money would become the wife's separate
money.67 The rule that a new acquisition takes the character of
what is given in exchange for it can be applied in a situation of
that kind. It should follow that by either an antenuptial or a
postnuptial contract Texas spouses can turn over their separate
assets to the community at an agreed valuation under an agree-
ment that restitution of a fixed amount will be made from com-
munity assets at the dissolution of the community. The prac-
tical operation of the community property system could be
greatly simplified if contracts of that kind would become a mat-
ter of common custom.
The result of applying the legal definitions to transactions
between the spouses has been to defeat the intention of the
spouses in certain situations without any inquiry into whether or
not there was any policy justification for doing so. The desires
of the spouses have been frustrated by the application of the
legal definitions in two types of situations: (1) gifts to the com-
munity, and (2) partitions of community property.
Gifts to the Community
Because of the legal definitions an attempted gift by one of
the spouses to the community will not be effective to vest owner-
ship in the community.6 8 Will the attempted gift have any
effect? If a third person attempted to make a gift to the com-
munity, presumably each of the spouses would acquire an un-
divided half interest as separate property.69 Similarly, it could
have been held that an attempted gift to the community by the
husband or wife would at least be effective as a gift to the other
spouse of an undivided half interest as separate property, but
in the cases where the deeds disclosed the intent to vest title by
gift in the community it was held that the attempted transactions
were entirely ineffective. 70 Where the deeds did not disclose
an intent to make a gift to the community, however, a different
result was reached. In Belkin v. Ray 7' a conveyance of the wife's
separate property to a trustee and a reconveyance to both the
husband and the wife were held effective to vest an undivided
half interest in each of the spouses, and oral evidence of an
67. See Kellett v. Trice, 95 Tex. 160, 171, 66 S.W. 51, 54 (1902).
68. Tittle v. Tittle, 148 Tex. 102, 220 S.W.2d 637 (1949); Kellett v. Trice,
95 Tex. 160, 66 S.W. 51 (1902).
69. Cf. Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472 (1883).
70. See note 68 supra. For an excellent review of the cases, see Note, 28
TEXAS L. Rsv. 275 (1949).
71. 142 Tex. 71, 176 S.W.2d 162 (1943).
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intent to vest title in the community was held inadmissible for
the purpose of invalidating the conveyances.
Partitions of Community Property
The application of the legal definitions to transactions be-
tween the spouses also resulted in a conclusion that the husband
and wife, while living together, could not convert community
property into separate property by a voluntary partition.72 How-
ever, the decisions striking down attempted partitions came at a
time when there was thought to be a need for effective trans-
actions of that kind.73 The statutes and the constitutional
definition of the wife's separate property were therefore amended
expressly to allow voluntary partitions of community property
at any time the spouses desire it.74 It is expressly provided that
the rights of existing creditors cannot be prejudiced by such a
partition. A writing is required, and whenever the partition
involves a valuation problem it is not effective until it has been
approved by the district court, a requirement imposed for the
protection of the wife.
The change in the law allows only voluntary partitions. It
does not affect the Texas rule that neither spouse can compel a
partition of community property during the continuance of the
marriage.7 5
Agreements on Permanent Separation
Permanent separation of the spouses without a divorce does
not dissolve the community. The usual rules for determining
the separate or community character of property continue to
apply to property acquired after a separation in the absence of
an agreement to the contrary. 76 And neither spouse can compel
a dissolution of the community except by obtaining a dissolution
of the marriage.77
72. King v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803 (1947); Bruce v. Permian
Royalty Co., 186 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), error ref. w.o.m.
73. Under the Revenue Act of 1942 there was discrimination against the
residents of community property states in the application of the federal
estate tax. It was thought that permitting a partition of community prop-
erty would furnish a possible remedy. See Comment, 24 TEXAS L. REV. 483
(1946).
74. The Constitution was amended in 1948. See TEx. CONST. ANN. Art.
16, § 15 (Vernon, Supp. 1954). The statutory provisions were enacted in
1949. Tex. Laws 1949, c. 242, p. 450; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art. 4624a
(Vernon, 1951).
75. Martin v. Martin, 17 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Com. App. 1929).
76. Carter v. Barnes, 25 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Com. App. 1930).
77. Martin v. Martin, 17 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Com. App. 1929).
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But the community property rules were not designed for the
situation where the spouses have permanently separated and
are not very appropriate in that context. There is likely to be a
need at that time for an adjustment of the property rights of
the spouses, and they ought to have contractual power to meet
the need with a property settlement dissolving the community.
Realizing the needs of the situation, the Texas courts have
extended to spouses who have permanently separated or who
are in the process of separating contractual powers denied to
married couples who are living together. Property settlements
on permanent separation are upheld if they are fair and equi-
table, even though they involve changing community property
into separate property by a transaction that does not fit into the
legal definitions.78 One civil appeals case held invalid the part of
a property settlement providing that future acquisitions would
be owned as separate property, invoking the usual rule that the
spouses cannot by agreement change in advance the character
of property to be acquired in the future. 79 But the contrary view
seems to be the prevailing view. According to the more authori-
tative cases a property settlement on permanent separation need
not be confined to the property on hand at the time; the spouses
can also validly stipulate against the continuance of the com-
munity and provide for individual ownership of property to be
acquired in the future.80
The Statute of Frauds
An oral agreement between the spouses as to the separate
or community character of land is sometimes ineffective because
some statute requires a writing. An oral gift of community land
by the husband to the wife would be ineffective because of the
statute requiring conveyances of land to be in writing.8 ' An oral
agreement between the husband and the wife for the sale of com-
munity land to the wife as her separate property would be
unenforceable because of the provision of the Statute of Frauds
relating to contracts for the sale of interests in land.82 Under the
78. Rains v. Wheeler, 76 Tex. 390, 13 S.W. 324 (1890); Speckels v. Kneip,
170 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), error ref.; Corrigan v. Goss, 160
S.W. 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913), error ref.
79. George v. Reynolds, 53 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), error dism.
80. Speckels v. Kneip, 170 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), error ref.;
Corrigan v. Goss, 160 S.W. 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913), error ref. And see
Coborn v. Collins, 244 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
81. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. Art. 1288 (1925).
82. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. Art. 3995 (1925).
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provisions of the Texas Trust Act enacted in 1943 an express
trust of land is invalid unless there is a writing. 3
Resulting and constructive trusts are not invalidated by the
Texas Trust Act even though they are not evidenced by any
instrument in writing.84 A theory. of resulting or constructive
trust is often available to establish equitable ownership in one of
the marital estates through the tracing of funds into the pur-.
chase although the legal title is vested in another of the estates.
Thus, if the wife's separate funds are used with her permission
to buy land in the husband's name, the purchase price being paid
in cash at the time of the deed, in the absence of further evi-
dence the equitable ownership of the land would be in the wife
as her separate property under a presumption of a purchase-
money resulting trust.8 5
If the wife turns her separate funds over to the husband to
be used by him in buying property in her name for her separate
estate, and the husband, violating her instructions, uses the
money to buy property in his own name, the wife would have a
choice of remedies. She could claim separate equitable owner-
ship of the property as the beneficiary of a constructive trust,"6
or she could claim a right to restitution of her money with an
equitable lien on the property as security.
8 7
But as a general rule a resulting or constructive trust must
be based upon the facts at the time the land is acquired. If land
is bought on credit during the marriage without any agreement
at the time of the deed as to how the price is to be paid, the
presumption of community is controlling and the land takes that
character. The subsequent use of separate funds to pay the
purchase-money debt would not change the ownership of the
land;'88 it would merely give a right of reimbursement from the
community in favor of the spouse whose funds were used. Fur-
thermore, an oral agreement between the spouses at the time
the debt was paid could not be effective to change the land
into separate property because of the Statute of Frauds.89 The
83. Tex. Laws 1943, c. 148, § 7, p. 232; TEx. REV. Cv. STAT. ANN. Art.
7425b-2 (Vernon, 1951).
84. See Texas Trust Act, § 2; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art. 7425b-2
(Vernon, 1951).
85. See the authorities cited in note 21 supra.
86. Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 411, 90 S.W. 485, 6 L.R.A.(N.s.) 381 (1906).
87. 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS 2432, § 508 (1939).
88. Goddard v. Reagan, 28 S.W. 352 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
89. Allen v. Allen, 101 Tex. 362, 107 S.W. 528 (1908).
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transaction would be classified as an attempted sale or convey-
ance of land from the community to the separate estate.
Where the deed by which the property is acquired reserves
an express vendor's lien, however, there is a problem as to the
effect of the concept that the vendor retains legal title until the
lien has been discharged. In Johnson v. Smith,90 decided prior
to the Texas Trust Act, the Supreme Court held that an oral
trust of land was enforceable when it had been declared by the
vendee subsequent to the deed but contemporaneously with the
discharge of an express vendor's lien, relying on the concept
that the legal title does not pass to the vendee until the express
vendor's lien is discharged. Using the same concept, in a case
where the husband used the wife's separate funds to discharge a
vendor's lien under an oral agreement between the spouses that
the wife would have a separate equitable interest in the property,
a court of civil appeals allowed the wife to establish pro tanto
equitable ownership on a theory of an enforceable express trust.9'
The Trust Act would now prevent the enforcement of an oral
express trust of land even if declared contemporaneously with
a transfer of legal title, but it is possible that in a case similar
to Johnson v. Smith arising out of facts occurring subsequent to
the, Trust Act the courts might now find that a constructive
trust to prevent unjust enrichment could be justified by invok-
ing the same title concept used in that case. But the reasoning
in Johnson v. Smith has never been entirely consistent with the
refusal to allow a purchase-money resulting trust in cases where
funds of one person have been used to discharge a vendor's lien
on land belonging to another; 92 and in order to avoid further
disturbance from an anomalous holding, Johnson v. Smith should
be relegated to the limbo of obsolete precedents by refusing to
extend it beyond the context of express oral trusts.
The Parol Evidence Rule
Where property is conveyed during the marriage to either
the husband or the wife or both, it is presumed to be community
property in the absence of any recitals in the deed indicating
separate ownershipY' Frequently, however, the deed to one of
the spouses will contain recitals affecting ownership. The extent
90. 115 Tex. 193, 280 S.W. 158 (1926).
91. Walkup v. Stone, 73 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), error dism.
92. Smith v. Buss, 135 Tex. 566, 144 S.W.2d 529 (1940); Oury v. Saunders,
77 Tex. 278, 13 S.W. 1030 (1890); Lusk v. Palmer, 87 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1935).
93. SPEER, LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS IN TExAs § 352 (3d ed. 1929).
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of the effect depends upon what the recitals are and how they
come to be inserted in the deed. In some cases the recitals would
operate to rebut the presumption of community and raise a pre-
sumption of separate ownership 4 In some cases the ownership
of the property depends entirely on the recitals because of the
applicability of the parol evidence rule.
The parol evidence rule has long been applied to a convey-
ance by one spouse to the other. When a deed from the husband
recited that the property was conveyed to the wife "for her sep-
arate use and benefit," it was held that the recital was contractual
and the parol evidence rule prevented enforcement of an oral
agreement by the wife to hold title in trust for the community.9
According to the language of the opinions, a recital in a deed
from the husband that the property is conveyed to the wife as
her separate property would be given the same effect.
Where the husband buys property with community funds,
taking title in the wife's name through a deed which recites
that the conveyance is to the wife as her separate property, there
has been some difference of opinion as to the applicability of
the parol evidence rule. According to the earlier authorities the
parol evidence rule would not be applicable to exclude evidence
of an agreement with the wife that the property would belong
to the community. 96 The rule would not apply, it has been said,
because the husband was not a party to the deedY7 A different
view was taken, however, in Lindsay v. Clayman,"s a recent de-
cision by the Texas Supreme Court. Where the husband was a
party to the transaction, although not a party to the deed, 99 the
parol evidence rule was applied to prevent proof of an oral
agreement that the wife was to hold legal title in trust for the
community, where the recitals of the deed inserted at the hus-
band's direction stated that the property was conveyed to the
wife as her separate property.
94. McCutchen v. Purinton, 84 Tex. 603, 19 S.W. 710 (1892).
95. McKivett v. McKivett, 123 Tex. 298, 70 S.W.2d 694 (1934); Kahn v.
Kahn, 94 Tex. 114, 58 S.W. 825 (1900).
96. McCoy v. Texon Royalty Co., 124 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939),
error dism., judgm. cor.; see McCutchen v. Purinton, 84 Tex. 603, 604, 19 S.W.
710, 711 (1892).
97. See Pointer v. Pointer, 197 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
98. 151 Tex. 593, 254 S.W.2d 777 (1952).
99. The husband was a party to a written contract to buy the property,
which also contained a recital that the property was to be the wife's separate
property, but the court did not seem to regard that fact as decisive. The
court relied upon and quoted with approval from Loeb v. Wilhite, 224 S.W.2d
343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), error ref. n.r.e., where a similar holding was one
of several grounds of decision, and the element of the husband's being a
party to the contract to buy was not present in the Loeb case.
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The holding in that case seems sound as applied to cases
where both spouses are active parties to the transaction, the
separate or community character of the property depends upon
the intention of the spouses, and the recitals in the deed can
properly be regarded as a written integration of an agreement
between them as to the character of the property. But those
elements are not present in all cases. Of course a spouse should
not be bound by a recital of which he did not know and to which
he did not consent. And even if there is knowledge and failure
to object, it might be improper to regard the writing as an
integration of an agreement between the spouses. For example,
if the husband, using community funds under his management
to buy property, has the draftsman insert in the deed a recital
that the property is conveyed to the husband as his separate
property, evidence that the wife knew of the recital and made
no objection would probably not be sufficient to bind the wife
by an application of the parol evidence rule. It could be said
that she was not a party to the transaction, or that the writing
could not properly be regarded as an integration of an agree-
ment between her and her husband that the property was to be
the husband's separate property.
Even where both spouses are parties to the transaction, the
parol evidence rule would not prevent extrinsic evidence to show
that a deed contained incorrect factual recitals. It could be
shown, for example, that a deed was actually a deed of gift
although it recited that a valuable consideration was being paid
for the property.0 0 Or a recital that separate funds had been
used in buying property could be contradicted by evidence that
community funds were used."1
Control and Management During the Marriage
Under the Texas law prior to 1913 there was unified man-
agement of all three of the marital estates. The husband had
the management of his own separate property, the wife's separate
property, 10 2 and the community property. 0 3 It was necessary
for the wife to join in conveyances of her separate land and of
the homestead, 10 4 and her assent was necessary to dispositions
100. Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472 (1883).
101. See McCutchen v. Purinton, 84 Tex. 603, 604, 19 S.W. 710. 711 (1892).
102. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. Art. 4621 (1911).
103. Id. Art. 4622.
104. It is still necessary, as a general rule, that both husband and wife
join in a conveyance of the wife's separate land or of the homestead. TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Arts. 4614, 4617, 4618 (Vernon, 1951).
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of her separate personalty,""5 but the general rule was that the
husband had sole management and control of all of the property.
Since he was the manager of the community, the law gave
to the husband full authority to bind the community estate by
incurring debts. The debts incurred by him during the marriage
were normally classified as community debts,1" 6 although the
creditor could levy upon the husband's separate property as
well as upon community property. 10 7 The corpus of the wife's
separate estate could not be reached to satisfy debts incurred by
the husband, 08 although the community revenue from her prop-
erty could be reached.
The giving of sole managerial power to the husband was
properly accompanied by a lack of contractual power in the
wife. If the husband's control of the community estate was to
be effective, he had to have control over the incurring of obliga-
tions as well as over the cash expenditures. Until early in the
twentieth century the wife had no power to bind herself or the
husband by ordinary contracts; the only debts for which the
wife could be held liable were those for the reasonable value
of necessaries furnished to her for herself and her children and
reasonable expenses incurred for the benefit of her separate
property. 10 9
The development of modem ideas as to the proper status of
married women made necessary some change in the Texas law
as to management of the marital estates. One change was made
in 1911; a statute enacted that year provided a method by which
a married woman could have her disabilities of coverture re-
moved and be declared a feme sole for mercantile and trading
purposes, thereby acquiring full contractual power." 0 The join-
der of the husband in a petition to the district court was re-
quired, and it was necessary for the court to determine whether
or not the removal of the disability would be to the wife's best
interest. The statute made clear that upon issuance of the order
removing the disability the wife was to have full contractual
power and that her separate estate was to be liable for debts
incurred by her, but did not make plain the extent to which the
105. See Bledsoe v. Fitts, 105 S.W. 1142, 1145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907),
error ref.
106. SPEER, LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS § 382 (3d ed. 1929).
107. See Moody v. Smoot, 78 Tex. 119, 123, 14 S.W. 285, 286 (1890).
108. Le Gierse & Co. v. Moore, 59 Tex. 470 (1883).
109. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. Arts. 4624, 4625 (1911); Harris v. Williams, 44
Tex. 124 (1875).
110. Tex. Laws 1911, c. 52, p. 92, 15 LAWS OF TEXAS 92 (Gammel 1911).
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order would be effective to give her other managerial powers
over her separate estate or the community revenue produced by
her property and efforts. The provisions of the 1911 statute were
carried into the 1925 revision and are still in effect,111 but the
judicial decisions involving the statute have not been illumi-
nating.112
A radical change in the allocation of managerial power be-
tween the spouses came in 1913. With a statute enacted that
year Texas embarked on an experiment in divided management
of community property. 113 One way of giving the wife an equal
share in management would have been to put the community
estate under the joint control of the spouses, allowing each of
them an equal voice as in the case of ordinary partnerships.
Instead of that Texas chose to divide the management, giving
each spouse exclusive control over a part of the community
estate. The division was evidently intended to be along the
same natural lines that ownership is divided in the modified
common law states. In addition to her separate property the wife
was to manage the revenue from her property and her own
earnings; the husband was to continue as manager of his separate
property, the revenue from it, and his earnings.
In order to make effective the wife's exclusive control it
was necessary to free the types of community under her man-
agement from liability for debts incurred by the husband. The
creditors of the husband were to look only to his separate prop-
erty and the part of the community estate under his manage-
ment; the creditors of the wife were to look only to her separate
property and the part of the community under her management.
The 1913 scheme seems basically sound. In determining the
managerial authority of the spouses and the rights of third per-
sons dealing with them, the law was to be as simple as is the
determination of ownership in the non-community states. For
those purposes there was to be no need to distinguish between
income and principal or between income produced by property
and income produced by personal efforts. It was to be compara-
tively easy to determine which spouse had authority to act, and
111. The statute, as amended in 1937, now appears as TEx. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. Art. 4626 (Vernon, 1951).
112. It has even been held that the 1911 statute was intended to impose
restrictions on powers the legislature did not grant to married women until
1913, apparently due to a failure to notice that the original statute antedated
by two years the grant of powers contained in the 1913 statute. Hirshfeld
& Co. v. Evans, 127 Tex. 254, 93 S.W.2d 148 (1936).
113. Tex. Laws 1913, c. 32, p. 61; 16 LAWS OF TEXAS 61 (Gammel 1914).
1955]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the authority was to be where the spouses and people dealing
with them would normally expect it to be. The individuality of
each spouse was fully recognized by the award of managerial
power. At the same time the advantages of a community prop-
erty system were retained by keeping unchanged the laws affect-
ing beneficial ownership. Being equal owners of community
property, the spouses would continue to have an equal interest
in the financial success of the marriage and to be bound together
by the knowledge that they were working together toward a
common goal. They were still to be equal partners, but instead
of one partnership there were to be two, one managed by the
husband and one managed by the wife.
But the 1913 plan as outlined above was never quite put into
effect. An important part of the plan was a grant of full con-
tractual power to the wife, a power she would obviously need
in order to be an effective manager of her separate property
and the part of the community put under her control. However,
the governor objected to the giving of contractual power to
married women, and the bill as finally passed did not contain
any express grant of contractual power. 114 That defect in the
law has been partially cured by judicial decision. Considerable
contractual power in married women has been derived by im-
plication from the express grant of power to manage and control
property,115 but the decisions have not been uniformly liberal""
and Texas married women are still handicapped as managers
by serious restrictions on their contractual powers and by large
areas of uncertainty and confusion in the law as to the extent
of their powers.
There was also some lack of clarity in defining the part of
the community estate committed to the wife's management.
The types of community property that were to be liable for the
wife's debts were described as "the personal earnings of the
wife, and the income, rents and revenues from her separate
property."'1 7 But in describing the types of community that
were to be under the wife's exclusive control and exempt from the
114. A summary of the legislative history of the 1913 act appears in
Red River National Bank v. Ferguson, 109 Tex. 287, 293, 206 S.W. 923, 926
(1918).
115. Levin v. Jeffers, 122 Tex. 83, 52 S.W.2d 81 (1932); Cauble v. Beaver-
Electra Refining Co., 115 Tex. 1, 274 S.W. 120 (1925); Gohlman, Lester & Co.
v. Whittle, 114 Tex. 548, 273 S.W. 808 (1925); Whitney Hardware Co. v.
McMahan, 111 Tex. 242, 231 S.W. 694 (1921).
116. Grant Lumber Co. v. Jones, 139 Tex. 647, 164 S.W.2d 1019 (1942);
Hirshfeld & Co. v. Evans, 127 Tex. 254, 93 S.W.2d 148 (1936).
117. Tex. Laws 1913, c. 32, p. 61, 16 LAWS OF TEXAS 61 (Gammel 1914).
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husband's debts, the statute listed the wife's personal earnings
and only certain varieties of income from her separate property;
not all varieties of income from her separate property were
included. The list included rent from the wife's separate real
estate, interest on her bonds and notes, and dividends on her
stock,118 but said nothing as to interest from her separate savings
account, revenue from the leasing of her separate chattels, in-
come from her separate business, or the receipts from a sale of
crops grown on her separate land. The fact that all of the revenue
from the wife's separate realty or personalty was made subject
to her debts strongly indicates that the listing of specific items
was intended to be illustrative, not exclusive, but that question
has not yet been entirely settled.
For a time there were cases holding that the listing was
exclusive. In First National Bank of Lewisville v. Davis"19 it
was held that the husband had power to mortgage cotton grown
on the wife's separate land to secure a community debt incurred
by him because the cotton could not be classified as "rent from
the wife's real estate." In several cases the husband's creditors
were allowed to reach the revenue from the wife's separate
business, 120 apparently without any consideration being given
to the possibility that revenue of that kind may have been put
under the wife's exclusive control and exempted from the hus-
band's debts by the provisions of the 1913 statute. In a civil
appeals case it was reasoned that revenue from the wife's sep-
arate copyright could be reached by the husband's creditors
because it was not included in the list of exempted items.
12 1
But the recent decision in Bearden v. Knight1 22 furnishes
strong support for the opposite view. In that scholarly opinion
the Supreme Court looked back to the general plan of the 1913
statute and concluded that First National Bank of Lewisville v.
Davis123 should be overruled. The exact holding was that all of
the revenue from the wife's separate land, whether technically
classifiable as rent or not, is under the wife's exclusive manage-
ment and free from liability for the husband's debts. The opinion
was confined to revenue from land, for that was the problem
118. Ibid.
119. 5 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Com. App. 1928), overruled by Bearden v. Knight,
149 Tex. 108, 228 S.W.2d 837 (1950).
120. Hardee v. Vincent, 136 Tex. 99, 147 S.W.2d 1072 (1941); Walker-
Smith Co. v. Coker, 176 S.W.2d 1002 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), error ref. w.o.m.
121. Simmons v. Sikes, 56 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), error dism.
122. 149 Tex. 108, 228 S.W.2d 837 (1950).
123. 5 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Com. App. 1928).
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before the court, but there is reasoning in the opinion that would
be equally applicable to revenue from personalty. Hence there
is still doubt as to revenue from personalty of types not specific-
ally listed, but it seems entirely possible that the Supreme Court
will now find that the statutory listing is not exclusive but
illustrative, and that the present statutes exempt from the hus-
band's debts and commit to the wife's exclusive management all
varieties of income from her separate property, real and personal.
An omission in the 1925 revision of the Texas statutes has
further complicated the problem of determining the extent of
the wife's managerial powers over community property. The
act of 1913 expressly gave to the wife exclusive power to manage
her personal earnings and the listed varieties of income from
her separate property, in addition to exempting those items from
the debts of the husband. In the 1925 revision the express provision
giving the wife power to manage those items was omitted, al-
though the provision exempting them from the husband's debts
was retained124 along with the provision subjecting the wife's
personal earnings and the revenue from her separate property
to liability for debts incurred by the wife.125 In the text usually
relied on by courts and lawyers in Texas it is concluded that
the 1913 plan by which the wife was given management of part
of the community estate was abandoned with the 1925 revision,'1 2
but there is ample internal evidence in the statutes to show
that the legislature did not so intend. The exemption of the
listed items from the husband's debts was continued,1 27 although
the only purpose of the exemption was to make effective the
wife's control. The provision subjecting the wife's earnings and
the revenue from her separate property to liability for her debts,
which also was continued in the 1925 revision,12 8 can be justified
only on the ground that the wife was intended to have control
over that part of the community estate. The omission in the
1925 revision can be explained in part by the attempted change
in the definitions of separate property that occurred in 1917 and
1921,129 the new definitions being carried into the 1925 revision13 0
before the decision in Arnold v. Leonard131 established the un-
124. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. Art. 4616 (1925).
125. Id. Art. 4623.
126. SPEER, LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS § 347 (3d ed. 1929).
127. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. Art. 4616 (1925).
128. Id. Art. 4623.
129. Tex. Laws 1917, c. 194, p. 436, 17 LAWS OF TEXAS 436 (Gammel 1917);
Tex. Laws 1921, c. 130, p. 251, 20 LAWS OF TEXAS 251 (Gammel 1920).
130. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. Arts. 4613, 4614 (1925).
131. 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925).
[VOL. XV
TEXAS COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW
constitutionality of the attempted change. At the time the 1925
revision was prepared, it must have been thought that it would
be unnecessary to give the wife express power to manage the
rent from her real estate, the interest from her bonds and notes,
and the dividends from her stock, because she was being given
express power to manage her separate estate, and all of those
items were made part of her separate estate by the new defini-
tions which put all of the revenue from her separate property
into the separate estate. 132 The omission of the express provision
giving the wife power to manage her personal earnings cannot
be explained in that, way, but in view of the other provisions
from the 1913 act that survived the revision it seems plain that
the omission of that provision was inadvertent. However, in the
case of Pottorff v. J. D. Adams Co.133 the court of civil appeals
relied upon the omission in the 1925 revision for the proposition
that the wife no longer has power to manage her personal earn-
ings. The recent decision in Bearden v. Knight'3 4 establishes
that no significance is to be given the omission of the express
provision giving the wife power to manage the rent from her
real estate, and in view of the court's scholarly review in that
opinion of the entire statutory history of the control and exemp-
tion provisions, it is possible that Pottorff v. J. D. Adams Co. will
be overruled and the wife's managerial authority over her earn-
ings restored to her without the necessity for an amendment of
the statutes.
There is another serious problem as to whether property
under the wife's management will remain under her manage-
ment after a change in form. If the wife accumulates the rent
from her separate estate and uses it to buy additional land, does
the wife have the management of the new community land, or
does it come under the husband's management? The only an-
swer consistent with the division of management contemplated
by the 1913 plan is that the new acquisition comes under the
wife's management. If there is to be an estate under the wife's
exclusive management, she must be able to invest and reinvest
the funds of that estate without interference from the husband
or his creditors. But under the present Texas authorities the
answer to the question is far from clear.
The uncertainty is caused by the holding in Strickland v.
132. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. Art. 4614 (1925).
133. 70 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), error ref.
134. 149 Tex. 108, 228 S.W.2d 837 (1950).
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Wester.135 In that case the Texas Supreme Court held that when
the wife invests her earnings in land, the exemption from the
husband's debts comes to an end and the husband's creditors can
reach the land. The opinion offered no explanation for that con-
clusion; it was merely stated that the question had received
careful consideration. Did the court give consideration to the
fact that the exemption from the husband's debts was an integral
part of a plan for dividing the management of the community
estate between the spouses, a plan under which the wife was to
have exclusive control of her personal earnings? Or was the
court thinking of the exemption of the wife's earnings as some-
thing comparable to the exemption of such items as current
wages and the tools of a trade? Did the court mean to imply
that when the wife is given the exclusive power to manage com-
munity funds derived from certain sources, her power ends as
soon as the funds are invested in other property, or did the
court assume that the omission in the 1925 revision had termi-
nated the wife's power to manage her personal earnings? The
opinion leaves those questions unanswered.
In the prior case of Hawkins v. Britton State Bank 36 it had
been held that the wife had exclusive management of hay-
harvesting equipment bought with rent from her separate farm;
the husband had no power to convey the equipment to his
creditors in payment of debts owed by him. The fact that the
rent from the wife's separate land was under her exclusive man-
agement was deemed sufficient to justify the conclusion that the
equipment bought with the rent was also under the wife's ex-
clusive management, free from the debts and control of the
husband. The Hawkins case was not questioned in the Strickland
case and is still a respected precedent.' 7
The Hawkins and Strickland cases are not in direct conflict.
They could be reconciled by distinguishing between the wife's
personal earnings and revenue from separate property, confining
the Strickland case to situations where the wife's personal earn-
ings are traced into other property. They could also be recon-
ciled by confining the Hawkins case within narrow limits. If
the wife is to manage her separate farm effectively, she must
have control not only of the receipts from the operation of the
farm but also of the farm equipment bought for use on the farm.
135. 131 Tex. 23, 112 S.W.2d 1047 (1938).
136. 122 Tex. 69, 52 S.W.2d 243 (1932).
137. In Bearden v. Knight, 149 Tex. 108, 228 S.W.2d 837 (1950), the
Hawkins case was relied on as a controlling precedent.
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The Hawkins case could be justified on the ground that giving
the wife exclusive management of the hay-harvesting equipment
was necessary in order to make effective the grant to her of
exclusive authority to manage her separate farm. But neither
way of reconciling the two cases will give full effect to the pur-
poses of the 1913 statute. The holding in the Strickland case is
inconsistent with the purposes of the 1913 plan and should be
overruled.
Succession on Death
On the death of a spouse intestate, the decedent's half of
the community property is inherited by the decedent's children
or their descendants.13 A provision that the surviving spouse
is entitled to the other half appears in the statute of descent, but
the survivor does not receive his half by inheritance; it is set-
tled that each spouse owns half of the community property
during the marriage and that on the death of one spouse the
other simply continues to own a half interest.139 If there are no
children or descendants surviving the decedent, the decedent's
half of the community is inherited by the surviving spouse.
140
When there are children or descendants, the surviving spouse
inherits one-third of the intestate's separate personalty and a life
estate in one-third of the separate land.141 If there are no chil-
dren or descendants, the surviving spouse inherits all of the
separate personalty and either one-half or all of the separate
land, depending on whether or not the decedent leaves a sur-
viving parent, brother, or sister.1 42
Except for certain allowances 43 and the homestead rights
of a surviving spouse and minor children, 44 under Texas law
each spouse has complete testamentary power over his or her
half of community property and over all of his or her separate
property. 45
Division on Divorce
In Texas the court has a great amount of discretion in divid-
ing the property of the spouses on divorce. At that time the
138. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. Art. 2578 (1925).
139. Jones v. State, 5 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Com. App. 1928).
140. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. Art. 2578 (1925).
141. Id. Art. 2571.
142. Ibid.
143. As to the allowance for a year's support to the widow and minor
children, see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Arts. 3476-3484 (Vernon, 1952). As to
the allowances in lieu of homestead and other exempt property, see id.
Arts. 3485-3495.
144. TEx. CONST. Art. 16, § 52 (1876).
145. SPEER, LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS § 315 (3d ed. 1929).
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court may do more than merely determine questions of owner-
ship and act on claims for reimbursement. According to the
statute, the court can make such division of the property of
the spouses as it deems just and right, subject to the limitation
that title to real estate must not be divested.1 46 Subject to that
limitation the court can take the property of one spouse and
award it to the other if the circumstances make it just to do so.
The division of the community property need not be equal if the
circumstances will justify awarding more than half of the com-
munity to one of the spouses. 147 The power of the court extends
to the separate property of both spouses, as well as to the
community property.14
The prohibition against divesting title to real estate is an
important limitation on the divorce court's power, but the
statute has been so construed as to allow the court significant
power over land. The awarding to one spouse of as much as a
life estate in the separate land of the other is not regarded as
divesting title to real estate.1 49 Furthermore, the court can
impose a trust on the land of one spouse, awarding to the other
a right to receive the income for life.150
The prohibition against divesting title to land applies to
community land as well as to separate land.'5 ' But a partition is
not a divesting of title within the meaning of the statute even
though a sale is necessary to effect the partition. 52 According to
some cases the divorce court may partition the community by
awarding all of the community land to one spouse if the other
is compensated for his or her interest with money or other
assets, 15 3 but there is conflict, other cases holding that such a
decree divests title to land in violation of the statute.1
5 4
It has been said that the trial court's discretion in dividing
146. TEX: REV. Civ. STAT. Art. 4638 (1925).
147. Trimble v. Trimble, 15 Tex. 19 (1855).
148. Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 248 S.W. 21 (1923).
149. Ibid.
150. Keton v. Clark, 67 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), error ref.; see
Ex parte Scott, 133 Tex. 1, 14, 123 S.W.2d 306, 313 (1939).
151. Reasonover v. Reasonover, 59 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
152. Scannell v. Scannell, 117 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), upheld
a sale of land to one of the spouses as a permissible method of effecting a
partition.
153. Simons v. Simons, 23 Tex. 344 (1859); Walker v. Walker, 231 S.W.2d
905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Daniel v. Daniel, 30 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930).
154. Hartman v. Hartman, 253 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Lewis
v. Lewis, 179 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); O'Neil v. O'Neil, 77 S.W.2d
554 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), error dism.
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property on divorce will not be reversed on appeal in the absence
of an abuse of discretion. 15 But the trial court must not act
arbitrarily, and must give consideration to the property rights of
both spouses. If there are no circumstances to justify a different
disposition the court should award the property according to
ownership, dividing the community equally between the
spouses.156
Various factors can justify an unequal division. The finan-
cial needs of the members of the family are of the greatest
importance. Permanent alimony is not allowed in Texas, but if
there is enough property on hand at the time of the divorce the
court can provide an effective substitute. 57 The court would
usually be concerned with providing for the future support of
the wife, but if the husband is the one who needs it the divorce
court can provide for his support out of the wife's property. 5 8
If there are dependent children, their need for support can be
taken into consideration in dividing the property, 5 9 but the
court is not confined to the property on hand in making provision
for the support of children under eighteen.16° Other factors
than need for support can be taken into consideration. The courts
have never attempted to formulate a complete list. It is proper
for the divorce court to consider the benefits that the innocent
spouse would have received from a continuance of the marriage,
the Supreme Court has said;' 6 ' at least to that extent it is proper
to consider who was at fault in the failure of the marriage. In
one case the fact that the wife had acquired her wealth by gift
from the husband was deemed significant. 16 2
155. Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 248 S.W. 21 (1923); Keton v. Clark,
67 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), error ref.
156. Reasonover v. Reasonover, 59 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
157. Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 248 S.W. 21 (1923); Keton v. Clark,
67 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), error ref.
158. Fitts v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 443 (1855).
159. Rice v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58 (1858).
160. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art. 4639a (Vernon, Supp. 1954).
161. Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 409, 248 S.W. 21, 22 (1923).
162. Fitts v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 443 (1855).
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